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This paper analyzes the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in SADC with a special focus 
on the SADC Organ and the emergence of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact in 2003. The primary aim of 
this paper is not only to investigate the regional organization’s methods of how to approach regional 
security issues, but also to question whether and to what extent SADC provides a regional response to 
security challenges. In doing so, emphasizing the utility of constructivism, this paper argues that SADC 
attempts to construct the politico-security regionalism which is made and remade by the regional 
member states in the post-Cold War era. 
 
Keywords: Politico-Security Regionalism, SADC, the SADC Organ, the SADC Mutual Defense 





In the early 1990s, the Southern African region emerged from protracted conflicts, which 
were primarily connected with the Cold War and apartheid destabilization. The regional 
security frameworks since the 1970s had been marked by deep-rooted conflicts, mostly of 
inter-state character, propelled by a number of internal and external factors (e.g. Khadiagala 
1994; Klotz 1995). Under the circumstance, SADCC (Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference) was formed in 1980 as par of the strategy of the Frontline States 
(FLS) to counter apartheid destabilization, reduce its members’ economic dependence on 
South Africa, and coordinate foreign aid and investment in the region (Matlosa 2001:393-
405). 
Following the end of the Cold War, however, the move towards amity in the post-
apartheid Southern African region coincided with the transformation of SADCC into SADC 
(Southern African Development Community) through the Windhoek Treaty in January 1992, 
which expanded to include the regional power, South Africa. Around this period, SADC 
attempted to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS)
1
 in 1996 
with a view to “allowing more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to 
sensitive and potentially explosive situations” (SADC Communique 1996). In a new regional 
and international order, it became imperative for SADC
2
 to set up its own security 
                                                          
1 The term of the Organ is seen by some as “borrowed” from the Organization of African Unity’s 
(OAU) Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
(Cilliers 1996: 2). 
2 Although SADC was mainly created as a socio-economic and developmental organization, but for the 
successful accomplishment of development and socio-economic prosperity we cannot estimate the 
value of peace and security in the region to excess. Although SADC defines itself as a developmental 
body, at the same time it sees itself as a sub-regional political (security) organization under the OAU 
(now the African Union: AU), that is, essentially a political organization (Solomon and Cilliers 1997: 
200). 
 KYU DEUG HWANG 68 
 
mechanism for striving towards political stability and ensuring collective security (Matlosa 
2001:406). 
Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of a number of regional approaches to 
security problems particularly in the developing world regions, with a better balance between 
the regions of the world (Alagappa 1993:439-67; Hettne 2001: 1-53; Pugh and Sidhu 2003: 
1-7). Since the end of the Cold War, however, these regional approaches to security 
problems in the developing world, including the SADC region appear to go beyond the 
example of Europe by taking on forms of regionalism which are (radically) different from 
the integrationist model of the European Union (EU). In fact, some scholars have argued that 
the theories of regional integration that have dominated the analysis of the European 
Community (EC; presently, EU) provide only a partial and incomplete guide to 
understanding contemporary regionalism, particularly developing world regionalism (Hurrell 
1995; Oden 1999).  
Thus, in discussing the question of whether and how SADC attempts to shape and modify 
or change the process of globalization and regionalization in politico-security terms, it is 
necessary to utilize a multi-dimensionality of contemporary regionalism, so called “new 
regionalism,”
3
 which would normally be based on constructivism as “one theoretical 
building block” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002: 45). The multi-dimensional nature of 
contemporary regionalism based on constructivism, has rendered social structures such as 
norms and ideas just as important as material structures, such as the balance of military 
power, in shaping the patterns of regionalism.  
Moreover, the important reason for using a constructivist perspective of international 
relations (IR) in this paper is that the rationalist theories such as neo-liberal institutionalism 
have limited relevance for SADC politico-security regionalism. Unlike the neo-liberal 
institutionalists’ argument of limiting sovereignty for increased cooperation, the SADC states 
seem to be more interested in state-building by strengthening their sovereignty instead of 
limiting it. Even though neo-liberal institutionalists are interested in legalistic norms, 
coercive rules and material interests, the SADC states are inclined to retain informal and 
non-legalistic norm-based rules which are considered as problems and challenges to 
overcome in a changed international environment after the Cold War.
4
 Furthermore, like 
neo-realism, , neo-liberal institutionalists take up rationalist and materialist conceptions of 
state behavior, often neglecting the “sociological and intersubjective processes underlying 
the emergence of cooperation” (Acharya 1998: 198-219). For these reasons, a constructivist 
perspective of IR is required of this paper to explain politico-security regionalism of SADC 
within the ideational as well as material factors. 
                                                          
3 The old regionalism, which was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, is apt to focus on a power-
based or material based structure, whereas the new regionalism, which is taking shape in a more 
multipolar world order, focuses not only on material incentives, but also ideational forces such as 
norms, institutions and identity. Above all, a defining characteristic is that new regionalism can be 
better understood in an open-ended or process-oriented context than in a fixed or deterministic one 
(Schulz, Söderbaum and Ö jendal 2001: 3-17). 
4 Although the formalization of the SADC Organ with the signing of the Protocol (on Politics, Defense 
and Security Cooperation) allowed SADC members to deal with regional security affairs within a 
legal framework, SADC members appear not to completely orient their organization towards a legally 
binding security architecture as was shown in the case of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact (see III-3).  





This paper analyzes the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in SADC with a 
special focus on the SADC Organ and the emergence of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact in 
2003. The primary aim of this paper is not only to investigate the regional organization’s 
methods of how to approach regional security issues, but also to question whether and to 
what extent SADC provides a regional response to security challenges. In doing so, 
emphasizing the utility of constructivism, this paper argues that SADC attempts to construct 
the politico-security regionalism which is made and remade by the regional member states in 
the post-Cold War era. This will, as a result, be conducive to understanding the character, 
nature and type of contemporary regionalism and regional security in Southern Africa.  
 
 
2. LINKING POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 
  
The term politico-security regionalism is composed of two different concepts: “political 
security” and “regionalism.” Politico-security regionalism is concerned with political 
security in its regional context. By politico- or political security,
5
 on the one hand, is meant 
the “security politics” of conflict and cooperation as social reality, which is defined and 
redefined by states as main actors. By regionalism,
6
 on the other hand, is meant a bundle of 
political ideas, norms and interests, which are socially (re)constructed by regional states. In 
this context, it is important to note that “regional states,”
7
 which denote the member states of 
regional grouping, should be distinguished from both global states and nation-states. In terms 
of the agents of regionalism, in fact, both terms “global states” and “nation-states” are not 
sufficient to explain the concept of politico-security regionalism.  
From a globalist perspective of Wallerstein’s world-system theory, states are normally 
seen as a substructure of international system to maintain a capitalist world system that 
contains a core, a periphery, and a semi-periphery (Viotti and Kauppi 1999: 341-60). From a 
neo-realist perspective of Waltz’s structural realism, states (which can be regarded as a major 
                                                          
5 Given that “all [security] threats …… are …… defined politically” (Buzan et al. 1998: 141), the 
influence of the other sectors on matters that affect security must be filtered through the political 
sector and must be relevant to that sector: namely, when developments in other sectors threaten to 
have political meanings, contexts and consequences such as threats to state boundaries, political 
institutions, or governing regimes, these other variables must be taken into account as a part of 
politico-security calculus (Ayoob 1995: 8). 
6  As Hurrell (1995: 333) notes, “the range of factors that may be implicated in the growth of 
regionalism is very wide and includes economic, social, political, cultural and historic dimensions”. 
Nonetheless, given that regionalism becomes a state or political project (Gamble and Payne 1996; 
Grugel and Hout 1999), regionalism can also be studied in the context of political dynamics that are 
socially constructed through various interactions among states. 
7 Given the core argument of Anderson (1991) in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism, as with nations, so regions can be seen as imagined communities which 
are brought into existence by human agency. In similar terms, Neumann (1994: 58) also argues that 
through the political project of region building, spokespersons for the community “imagine a certain 
spatial and chronological identity for a region and disseminate their imagined identity to others.” In 
this context, politico-security regionalism in this paper can be seen as a political project of region 
building which is made and remade by regional states as main actors who attempt to deal with 
“security politics” surrounding conflict and cooperation. 
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component of anarchical international structure) are powerless to change the structure in 
which they find themselves (Viotti and Kauppi 1999: 66-76). Both perspectives are 
deterministic in character in which individual policymakers can do little to affect events 
despite a differing degree. In exploring the concept of politico-security regionalism driven by 
regional states as main actors, however, the term “regional states” is often used from the 
perspective of social constructivism so that it can be seen as constitutive elements in which 
intersubjective factors such as norms, identities and interests are not treated as fixed, but as 
being flexible, to be made and remade (e.g., Söderbaum 1998: 75-92). This means, by 
implication, that the concept of politico-security regionalism can be best understood in a 
constructivist perspective of IR that emphasizes the open-ended context of political projects 
to be constructed by “regional states” in response to external, as well as internal forces.  
Despite the various strands of constructivism in IR theory,
8
 what all varieties of 
constructivism share is a belief that no objects of our knowledge are independent of our 
(re)interpretations which produce social reality. Rather, social meaning is constructed and 
reconstructed by social interaction which creates certain mechanisms of norms, identities and 
interests that guide human actions (Adler 1997: 319-63).  
According to Reus-Smit (2001: 216), constructivism can be identified with three basic 
claims that serve as a useful starting point: first, normative and ideational structures are just 
as important as material structures
9
; second, understanding how non-material structures 
condition actors’ identities is important because identities inform interests and, in turn, 
actions
10
; third, agents and structures are mutually constituted.
11
  
                                                          
8 By and large, there are four constructivist approaches to IR: modernist, modernist linguistic, radical 
and critical constructivism (see Adler 2002: 97-8). 
9  The first claim implies that instead of focusing solely on material incentives, constructivists 
emphasize the importance of shared knowledge, learning, ideational forces and normative and 
institutional structures (Hurrell 1995: 353). In this sense, as Hurrell (1995: 352) argues, the 
constructivist approach “focuses on regional awareness and regional identity, on the shared sense of 
belonging to a particular regional community, and on what has been called ‘cognitive regionalism’.’’ 
10 The second claim indicates that identities are important because they frame the interests of actors: 
that is, “identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt 1992: 398). For the relationship between identities 
and interests, Hopf (1998: 175) argues that “in telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a 
particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and 
with respect to particular actors.” In fact, constructivism focuses on the intersubjective nature of 
regional bodies, in which developing a shared sense of belonging or regional identity/interest is 
regarded as a significant part of institutionalizing regional cooperation. Unlike a rationalist approach, 
with the state very much as a given, the constructivist approach examines how the identities and 
interests of actors are constructed within the context of different processes of interaction, cultures and 
histories. Hence, the constructivist approach attempts to explore how the sharing of norms, ideas and 
identities is conducive to the character and emergence of regional cooperation and regional 
arrangements. 
11  The third claim is closely related with the “agent-structure problem” better known as social 
structuration theory of Giddens (1984). This agent-structure problem arises from “two uncontentious 
truths about social life: first, that human agency is the only moving force behind actions, events, and 
outcomes of the social world; and second, that human agency can be realized only in concrete 
historical circumstances that condition the possibilities for action and influence its course” (Dessler 
1989: 443; Wendt 1987: 337). For example, the emergence of the SADC Organ (OPDS) could be 





Although there is considerable division between different brands of constructivism, all 
constructivists  with the exception, perhaps, of the extreme postmodernist wing of radical 
constructivism  agree that reality is socially constructed (Adler 2002; Guzzini 2000), that 
ideational structures condition the identities and interests of agents and hence form their 
actions, and that the relationship between agent and structure is mutually constitutive (Wendt 
1987; 1992; 1999). With regard to the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in SADC, 
it is worth illuminating three concepts that emanate from constructivism that inform us 
important things about the way that politico-security regionalisms are constructed and 
reconstructed. These concepts are: institutions, norms and collective identity. 
 
 
3. CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES TO POLITICO-SECURITY  




Constructivism focuses on the intersubjective nature of regional groups, including SADC, 
where developing a regional identity or shared sense of belonging is seen as an essential part 
of institutionalizing regional (security) cooperation (Hook and Kearns 1999: 3). In fact, 
institutions not only take such a rationalist or utilitarian role as the calculation of costs and 
benefits, but also constitute (regional) identity and interests through interactions among 
actors who are affecting the idea of each other (Acharya 2001: 22-4).  
As Adler and Barnett (1998: 42) argue, although international relations theory 
traditionally views international institutions as constraints on state actions, institutions may 
be seen as “structures” or as “processes”: in fact, “a key constructivist point is that norms, 
rules and institutional contexts constitute actors and constrain choices.” Thus, using a 
constructivist perspective of IR to study the development of politico-security regionalism 
would mean going beyond the study of “how states should choose or how they should 
bargain” (Kowert 1998/99: 2). Rather, studying the effect and role of institutions from a 
constructivist perspective of IR helps us to examine how institutions promote four factors: 
first, the development of mutual trust; second, the forming of shared identity; third, the 
creation of regional culture or value system, involving democracy and human rights; finally, 
the cultivation of social learning which represents the capacity of social actors to manage and 
even transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world and their 
identities (Adler and Barnett 1998: 42-4). 
In terms of the scope and style of institutionalization in SADC, the establishment of 1996 
SADC Organ (OPDS) is the case in point. The Organ resulted in the emergence of a formal 
regional security mechanism out of an informal and an ad hoc style of the FLS, which 
eventually helped the SADC member states to institutionalize political and security 
                                                                                                                                                      
realized in a new and changing international milieu and a recognition that many of the problems and 
threats faced by the region which “can only be addressed through increased cooperation” in the post-
Cold War era (Van Aardt 1997: 23). Nonetheless, the OPDS(C) was constructed by the member states 
of SADC in its own ways: for the OPDS(C), although SADC leaders sought to consolidate a formal 
regional security structure with signing the OPDSC Protocol, SADC committed itself to the principle 
of “national sovereignty” by opting for the consensual decision-making structure within SADC 
(SADC OPDSC Protocol 2002). 
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cooperation in the form of OPDS. In the post-Cold War era, although SADC has been 
striving to invent new regional security frameworks to increase regional security, in fact, the 
OPDS resulted from the historical development of the FLS, the Inter-State Defense and 
Security Committee (ISDSC), SADCC, SADC and the Association of Southern African 
States (ASAS). That is, the establishment of the OPDS has been a product both of history 
and evolution. This implies that the SADC member states have sought to develop the 




Nevertheless, SADC was initially incapable of placing the OPDS under the structure of 
SADC as a whole. The 1996 SADC Summit stipulated that the Organ would “function 
independently” of other SADC structures (SADC Communique 1996). Owing to this 
decision, SADC was put to have two summit level bodies with no clear authority relations 
between them. Indeed, this led to the rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Whereas 
Zimbabwe insisted that the Organ was an autonomous security mechanism, South Africa 
argued that the Organ should be subordinate to the SADC Summit, which the SADC Treaty 
declared “the supreme policy-making institution of SADC” under Article of 10(1) (SADC 
1992).  
While the SADC Organ had initially been headed by Zimbabwe’s Mugabe, SADC 
members at the Blantyre Summit in August 2001 decided to bring the Organ under SADC 
control. The formalization of the SADC Organ with the signing of the Protocol (on Politics, 
Defense and Security Cooperation) allowed SADC members to deal with regional security 
affairs within a legal framework. This implies that the signing of the Protocol would clarify 
what the member states can and cannot do under the auspices of the “new” SADC Organ. 
Thus, the structure, mechanisms, and functions of the Organ will be controlled by the new 
Protocol on OPDSC. The Protocol signed by SADC Heads of State and Governments in 
August 2001 provides for a fairly elaborate structure of the Organ (SADC OPDSC Protocol 
2002).  
 
- the Organ is guided by a troika (composed of the current, outgoing and incoming Chair) 
reporting to the SADC Summit;  
- under the troika there is the Ministerial Committee comprising SADC Ministers responsible 
for foreign affairs, defense, public security and state security;  
- under this Committee two ministerial subcommittees are devised; 
- one is an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), to be set up comprising 
ministers responsible for foreign affairs to fulfill the objectives of the Organ relating to 
politics and diplomacy;  
- the other is an Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC), which has been existent 
for more than 20 years, composed of ministers of defense, public and state security. ISDSC 
will enhance regional confidence building, including the fields of disaster management, 
satellite communications, peacekeeping training and doctrine, and public security issues such 
                                                          
12 Prior to the creation of SADC, in particular, the ISDSC (which was formed in 1975 as an important 
structure of the FLS) continued to exist as an institution of the SADC Organ even after dissolution of 
the FLS. Like the FLS, the ISDSC is not based on a treaty, charter or constitution. Nor does it have a 
permanent headquarters or secretariat. However, it is more formally structured than the FLS. Three 
sub-committees  Defense, Public Security, and State Security  were set up to facilitate the 
ISDSC’s work, (see Berman and Sams 2000: 160-67; and also Matlosa 2001: 414). 





as drug trafficking and firearm-smuggling.  
 
In terms of the structure and function of the OPDSC, the 2001 Blantyre Summit solved 
some of the major problems that had hampered the work of the Organ. The new Organ would 
be run by a leadership troika  following the same principle as the SADC chairmanship. 
That is, the SADC Organ was integrated into the SADC structure and report to the SADC 
Summit, rather than acting as an independent institution in the tradition of the FLS. In this 
way, the SADC member states attempted to consolidate a formal regional security structure 
within SADC in developing a common approach to the SADC Organ and its area of 
operation.  
Meanwhile, for SADC(C), although South Africa was strong enough to dominate other 
regional states in military and economic terms during the apartheid era, South Africa has 
attempted to transform its position (as a regional hegemon) towards a “pivotal”
13
 state in 
regional order since the demise of apartheid (Habib and Selinyane 2004: 49-60). In terms of 
peace and security in Africa, this means that South Africa attempts to pursue a policy of 
“non-hegemonic cooperation” through multilateral organizations like SADC, AU, the NAM, 
and the Commonwealth (Habib and Selinyane 2004: 52). At the same time, South Africa also 
appeared as a regional powerbroker not only with the capacity to back up political 




What is noted is that a multilateral approach among SADC members has largely been 
placed under South Africa’s leadership. Since South Africa has projected itself as an 
“emerging (middle) power”
15
 (Schoeman 2003: 349; Van der Westhuizen 1998: 435-55) 
with support from the West in the post-apartheid period, it is likely that SADC may be 
influenced by the West, constructing its type and style of regional approach to security 
cooperation in the region. This means that SADC has attempted to take advantage of 
multilateral organizations such as the UN which is largely influenced by the West, 
particularly, given the structure of the Security Council. 
In this period, the SADC member states seem to have largely focused on collective 
security and/or collective defense under the SADC Organ within the region. The objectives 
of the SADC Organ (OPDS) laid down collective security arrangements which are largely 
associated with a “regional alliance system” for the SADC security structure (SADC 
Communique 1996; Hough 1998: 25).  
Nevertheless, given the fact that the term “cooperative security” tends to connote 
consultation rather than confrontation and reassurance rather than deterrence, SADC seems 
                                                          
13 The term ‘pivotal’ gives a significant character to South Africa’s foreign policy that implicitly 
emphasizes multilateralism, non-hegemonic behavior, and partnership (see Habib and Selinyane 2004: 
53). 
14 The involvement of South Africa in the peace processes in Burundi and the DRC demonstrates that 
South Africa has, to some extent, committed itself to play a leadership role in addressing regional 
security problems (see Schoeman 2003; Habib and Selinyane 2004).  
15 South Africa is often regarded as an emerging power, referring to its position as a regional leader and 
its position in the international or global political system as a feasible middle power: in terms of its 
role as a middle power, South Africa (that is considered to be ‘emerging’) would seem to have a role 
somewhat different from established, developed middle powers such as Canada and the Scandinavian 
states (Schoeman 2003: 349-65; also Van der Westhuizen 1998: 435-55). 
 KYU DEUG HWANG 74 
 
to have committed itself to cooperative security approaches in addressing regional conflicts. 
SADC is seeking the principle of non-confrontation and non-use of force, placing an 
emphasis on the development of dialogue and consultation with external organizations, 
including the UN, and various NGOs (namely, second-track or semi-official security 
dialogue). For SADC, Article 11(2) of the OPDSC Protocol (which promotes consultation 
with the UN Security Council) paves the way for SADC to collaborate with external 
organizations like the UN in addressing regional security problems (SADC OPDSC Protocol 
2002). 
Moreover, SADC attempted to contribute to efforts toward regional confidence building 
through the SADC Mutual Defense Pact (SADC Mutual Defense Pact 2003). Considering 
that cooperative security approaches are geared towards the development of mutuality of 
security, based on mutual reassurance rather than deterrence, reassurance in SADC has been 
developed through increased “transparency” of military forces and confidence in security-
building measures (CSBMs). Thus, mutual reassurance has been pursued by SADC, at least 
in theory, in order not only to reduce the mistrust between member states, but also to build 
confidence among the regional states through discussion, negotiation, cooperation and 
compromise.  
Even though SADC is concerned about managing regional conflicts by “peaceful means,” 
it seems to be also interested in committing itself to “hard regionalism” in terms of conflict 
management. Within the context of a legally binding security architecture, the SADC 
OPDSC Protocol stipulates the jurisdiction of the Organ by stressing the approach to 
“resolution” of regional conflicts. Moreover, according to Article 11(1d) of the OPDSC 
Protocol, “the Organ shall seek to ensure that the Signatories adhere to and enforce all 
sanctions and arms embargoes imposed on any party by the United Nations Security 
Council” (SADC OPDSC Protocol 2002). In this regard, SADC, as both Articles of 11(3a) 
and 11(1d) of OPDSC Protocol illustrate, explicitly stipulates how and to what extent the UN 
can intervene in its regional affairs, which opens the door for the SADC member states to 
rely upon hard security or militaristic approaches to addressing regional conflicts.  
With regard to the character and nature of institutionalization, SADC can be found in 
whether and to what extent the organization is willing to commit itself to “soft” or “hard” 
regionalism in terms of conflict management. On the surface at least, of institutional 
structure, SADC has attempted to orient itself towards a legally binding security architecture 
by restructuring not only the SADC Organ but the whole organization.  
 
3.2. Norm-based Conflict Management 
 
The concern with norms makes constructivists see actors and structure much differently 
from the rationalist approaches to the study of politico-security regionalism. Although there 
exist different views between neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism in terms of the 
possibilities for interstate cooperation in regional and global structure, both approaches 
assume a world controlled by rational actors, whose relations are formulated by the balance 
of material power (Jervis 1999: 42-61). Nonetheless, norms are intersubjective beliefs about 
the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action. 
Norms are beliefs rooted in and reproduced through social practice (Wendt 1995: 73-4; 
Jepperson, et al. 1996: 54).  
According to Krasner (1983: 2), “norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of 
rights and obligations,” In fact, the definition and functions of norms vary. Kratochwill 





(1989: 70) offers three ordering functions of norms: first, by “ruling out” certain methods of 
individual goal seeking through the stipulation of forbearances, norms define the area within 
which conflict can be bounded; second, within the restricted set of permissible goals and 
strategies, rules that take the actors’ goals as given can create schemes or schedules for 
individual or joint enjoyment of scarce objects: third, norms enable the parties whose goals 
and/or strategies conflict to sustain a “discourse” on their grievances, to negotiate a solution, 
or to ask a third party for a decision on the basis of commonly accepted rules, norms and 
principles. 
Although many theories of IR, including neo-liberal institutionalism, recognize the 
importance of norms, constructivism allows for a much deeper understanding of norms in 
forming international relations (Acharya 2001: 24). As Katzenstein (1996: 5) notes, norms 
play two particular roles within international organizations and regional mechanisms. First, 
norms prescribe the proper enactment of an already defined identity, thus having “regulative” 
effects that specify standards of proper behavior. This means that the regulative effects of 
norms contribute to constraining the activities of actors. Second, norms define the identity of 
an actor, thus having “constitutive” effects that specify what actions will cause relevant 
others to recognize a particular identity. That is, norms not only prescribe and regulate 
behavior (the regulative effect), they also define and constitute identities (the constitutive 
effect). To put it differently, given that the concept of state is not only constituted by 
international norms, but also constrained by them (Biersteker 2002: 157-76), norms can be 
seen as fulfilling a constitutive function as well as a regulative one.  
SADC(C) has tried to utilize political norms in conflict management. During the Cold 
War, SADCC established the 1980 Lusaka Declaration for the primary purpose of economic 
liberation in Southern Africa. By adopting the Declaration, the SADCC member states also 
provided four basic objectives to address regional security problems: (1) reduction of 
economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on South Africa, (2) the forging of links to 
create a genuine and equitable regional integration (3) the mobilization of resources to 
promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies, and (4) concerted 
action to secure international cooperation within the framework of a strategy for economic 
liberation (Southern African Record 1987:4).  
However, sovereignty was a core norm of SADCC except when it came to apartheid 
South Africa. Although Article 2 of the OAU, which impacted on the evolution and 
framework of the FLS as the antecedent of SADCC, stipulates the norms of non-intervention 
and state sovereignty, the OAU leaders agreed that South Africa should be excluded from the 
protection of the organization’s norms because South Africa was (then) a non-member 
(Klotz 1995: 76). Under the circumstances, SADCC as a response to apartheid South Africa 
intended not to commit itself to the Westphalian norms such as non-interference in internal 
affairs, non-use of force in interstate relations and pacific settlement of disputes. Rather, 
SADCC members appropriated such continental and global norms as “racial equality” so as 
to make the organization serve as a unifying focus for regional security cooperation. 
After the end of the Cold War, although SADC pursued the principle of pacific 
settlement of disputes in its own region with a view to addressing regional security problems 
by peaceful means, SADC seems to be also interested in using explicitly legally-oriented 
words such as conflict resolution. Moreover, SADC established the Mutual Defense Pact in 
2003 in order to make provision for the member states to protect one another from external 
aggressions on their own intent and purposes.  
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Nonetheless, given the fact that SADC is unable to form a formal military alliance like 
NATO owing mainly to lack of military capabilities, the regional group seems to prefer the 
method of diplomatic negotiations to the one of militaristic measures. For instance, as Article 
11(1b) and 11(1c) in the OPDSC Protocol emphasize the importance of peaceful settlement 
of disputes, it can largely be assumed that the principle of pacific settlement of disputes in 
SADC is significant (SADC OPDSC Protocol 2002). Hence, the emergence of the 2003 
SADC Mutual Defense Pact cannot be seen merely as a move toward a more militaristic 
direction in SADC’s security integration, but rather as a political scheme for the SADC 
member states to develop the diplomatic means to be applied prior to a scheme of armed 
force as a last resort (Van Nieuwkerk 2003: 2-3). In fact, the primary and root causes of 2003 
SADC Mutual Defense Pact (which were intricately embedded in the course of development 
of the past regional projects, including the FLS alliance, ISDSC, SADCC, SADC, ASAS, 
OPDS and currently OPDSC) can and should be understood in such unique historical and 
political contexts as the racial confrontation between South Africa and SADCC members 
during the apartheid era, and the rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe in the post-
apartheid period (e.g. Ngoma 2004: 412-413; Schoeman 2004: 10).  
In this regard, it can be assumed that such political norms as the pacific settlement of 
disputes in regional conflict management are open to be restructured and applied to its own 
historical and social context. In terms of managing conflicts in SADC, therefore, it is 
important to note that when the norm of pacific settlement of disputes is applied to regional 
context, it is not automatically given, but rather produced and reproduced through the various 
interactions of the political elites of each regional group. When the SADC(C) member states 
recognized their limits to resolve regional conflicts by themselves, though, they attempted to 
engage external powers to address the conflicts with the intention of temporarily allowing the 
intervention of the outside powers, at the same time compromising the norms of non-use of 
force and/or pacific settlement of disputes.
16
  
In the post-Cold War era, moreover, SADC has placed emphasis on conventional 
international norms such as non-interference in dealing with regional security problems. 
Given the fact that the regional group is political entities with “weak” state structures and a 
lack of strong regime legitimacy, the norm of non-interference should be understood in the 
context of the domestic security concerns of regional member states in SADC. That is, one of 
the main reasons for SADC to adhere to the norm of non-interference can be found in the 
context of the organization’s search for internal stability and regime security. After the end 
of the Cold War, it has been argued that the primary sources of threat to the national security 
of SADC states are not external, but internal (Nathan and Honwana 1995: 6). 
However, the norm of non-interference does not mean a sense of indifference towards 
each other. In fact, SADC took the lead in responding to the DRC conflict after the leaders 
found that peace and stability in the region could not be realized without regional solidarity 
on security problems. In addition, regional confidence security-building measures (CSBMs), 
which have the potential to erode the norm of non-interference, have been advocated by 
SADC in the Mutual Defense Pact. Nonetheless, considering that CSBMs are concerned 
                                                          
16 Unlike conventional alliance, which was largely formed in line with the East-West rivalry during the 
Cold War, SADCC as an antecedent of SADC opted to follow an unconventional alliance that was 
inclusive to the Western as well as the Eastern bloc (e.g. Khadiagala 1994; Sesay 1985). In the post-
Cold War period, SADC ambassadors actively lobbied at the UN for the acceptance of the 
responsibilities in resolving the regional conflicts, including the DRC conflicts (ICG 2004).   





about the issue of a “non-aggression treaty” (Hough 1998: 28), CSBMs in the SADC Mutual 
Defense Pact should be understood in the context of norms such as non-aggression and/or 
non-interference in the region. By implication, thus, this ambivalence leaves room for SADC 
not only to apply such complex norms as non-interference to each situation as suitably, but 
also to develop “interactions that are interconnected in unanticipated and non-linear ways” 
(Adler 2002: 110).   
For SADC, norms such as non-interference are not fixed in their definition and functions, 
but rather open to be structured and restructured in the member states’ own intent and 
interest. To put it differently, norms not only regulate behavior, they also constitute new 
interests and identities (Katzenstein 1996: 5). In this context, it can be argued that while the 
regulatory effect of norms refers to a rationalist-behavioral conception of process in which 
identities and interests are exogenous to interaction, the constitutive effect of norms refers to 
a cognitive, intersubjective one in which they are endogenous (Katzenstein 1996: 5; Wendt, 
1992: 394). Thus, the norm of non-interference for SADC should be understood in the 
constitutive context as well as the regulatory. Yet, although the regulatory effect of norms in 
relation to formal and legalistic rules was pointed out in the OPDSC for SADC, in reality, 
the constitutive effect of norms (in relation to such cognitive factors as intersubjective 
knowledge, ideas and identity) occupies a key position not only in driving political actors’ 
behavior, but also in understanding the mechanisms of conflict management in SADC.  
 
3.3. Collective (Regional) Identity as Exceptionalism 
 
Collective identity refers to “positive identification” with the welfare of the others, which 
is regarded as a “cognitive extension” of the Self rather than as independent: in this context, 
collective identity can be regarded as an essential element for the sense of “solidarity, 
community and loyalty” (Wendt 1996: 52). According to Hasenclever, et al. (1997: 186), 
collective identity implies that regional actors respect each other as members of a community 
in which decisions are taken on a consensus basis. By implication, for SADC, this means that 
collective (regional) identity can be understood as the basis of regional consensus such that 
peace and stability in the region cannot be realized without regional solidarity on security 
problems.  
Collective identity is a basis for “feelings of solidarity, community, and loyalty” and for 
“collective definitions of interests.” Yet, this does not mean that state actors no longer 
calculate costs and benefits, but that they do so on a “higher level of social aggregation”; this 
then facilitates collective action by “increasing diffused reciprocity and the willingness to 
bear costs without selective incentives” (Wendt 1996: 53).  
In searching for regional identity during the Cold War era, the SADCC states committed 
themselves to the informality and decentralization of the organization, which contributed to 
the creation of a collective identity in the region. In fact, the orientation of SADCC towards 
informal and decentralized structure through a sectoral responsibility approach helped the 
organization to construct a spirit of “we” among its members (Mandaza and Tostensen 1994: 
72). As a result, SADCC’s commitment to the informality and decentralization of the 
organization was ultimately conducive not only to protecting each member country’s 
national dignity and sovereignty, but also to consolidating a collective regional identity by 
means of leaving room for flexibility or exceptions for regional leaders to search for.  
Yet, the SADC member states not only have divided perceptions of what are in their 
national interests relating to regional conflicts, but also lack such a certain convergence of 
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value systems as liberal democracy. For SADC, the members remain divergent with regard 
to their post-colonial political setting, level of economic development, and 
cultural/ideological make-up. Nonetheless, SADC tried to promote the coordination of the 
different national interests into a harmonized sub-regional scheme through which the 
member states gradually began to form collective regional identities with a view not only to 
increasing the cooperative spirit amongst the member states, but also to reducing the 
likelihood of use of force in inter-state relations (Ngoma 2005). This implies that the 
collective identity formation in SADC cannot be regarded simply as an end-result out of a 
certain convergence of self-interests and/or egoistic values, but rather as a process that leads 
to the “structural transformation of the Westphalian states system from anarchy to authority” 
(Wendt, 1994: 393). In this context, Acharya (1998: 206) argues as follows: 
 
Collective identities among states are constructed by their social interactions, rather than 
given exogenously to them by human nature …… or …… the international distribution of 
power …… regional cooperation among states is not necessarily a function of immutable or 
pre-ordained variables such as physical location, common historical experience …... Rather, 
regionalism may emerge and consolidate itself within an intersubjective setting of dynamic 
interactions …… 
 
Elaborating collective identity, Wendt (1996:53) also used as an example the difference 
between alliances and collective security arrangements, which are both instructive. On one 
hand, he considers alliances as “temporary coalitions of self-interested states” who join 
together for instrumental reasons in response to a specific threat. As soon as the threat is 
gone, the basis for the coalition also evaporates and the alliance gets disbanded. With 
collective security arrangements, on the other hand, states make commitments to multilateral 
action against non-specific threats. In such multilateral institutions, collective identity is not 
a sine qua non for its creation, but it nevertheless provides an important foundation for 
member states to increase the willingness to act based on “generalized principles of conduct” 
and diffuse reciprocity (Wendt 1996: 53; also Job 1997: 167-68). 
With regard to security structures and/or systems, SADC sought to search for its own 
approaches to conflict management in direct or indirect opposition to the security institutions 
and practices in Europe. For example, SADC did not form a formal military alliance like the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) owing mainly to the lack of military capabilities, 
but rather it has opted for its own styles to respond to regional security problems. This 
implies that SADC(C) seems to have searched for a collective regional identity so as to 
consider itself as a distinct regional group from the European one, in which it could redefine 
regional security mechanisms within its own regional context. Indeed, although the SADC 
Mutual Defense Pact, under collective self-defense, makes provision for the member states to 
protect each other from external aggression, the SADC member countries do not commit 
themselves to the principle of “an attack on one is an attack on all,” as is the case for NATO 
(SADC Mutual Defense Pact 2003).   
In terms of collective security arrangements, in addition, although SADC seems to have 
largely focused on collective security and/or collective defense under the SADC Organ 
within the region (Hough 1998: 25-6), it did not establish a genuine meaning of collective 
security system in the region. Given the assumption that the idea of collective security is 
based on a preponderance of physical force allied against any aggressor as well as a legal 
agreement to regulate international behavior (Snyder 1999: 108), in reality, it will be difficult 





for SADC states to develop self-reliant collective security systems owing mainly to the fact 
that most of the members in the regional group are composed of weak states. In this sense, it 
may be inferred that SADC is, to some extent, lacking the (complete?) level of collective 
identity in particular terms of collective security arrangements as a measure of such a 
collective identity.  
Nevertheless, as Wendt (1996: 53) argued, collective identity is not equivalent (or 
essential) to such multilateral institutions as a collective security arrangement. For SADC, 
what is important for a collective regional identity is the processes of such positive 
identification as the spirit of rising or enhanced cooperation among regional actors, which 
are reproduced and transformed by their intersubjective ideas and practices. In this sense, as 
Acharya (2001: 29, 202) notes, the emergence of cooperative security can also be considered 
as an important criterion to examine the meaning and value of a collective regional identity. 
In this regard, SADC is attempting to promote “inclusive regionalism” as an important 
component of the principle of “cooperative security”: for SADC, the promotion of the 
interoperability between SADC and non-SADC organizations as implied in Article 11(2c) of 
OPDSC. This demonstrates that SADC seems to be developing a collective regional identity 
through such multilateral efforts as positive, inclusive and cooperative approaches to 
regional security problems.     
Summing up, the emergence of both the OPDSC Protocol in 2001 and the SADC Mutual 
Defense Pact in 2003 has opened the way for the member states to deal with military 
conflicts in the region. But the Defense Pact does not go further in legally committing 
members to military enforcement action than what the Protocol already did (Hammerstad 
2004: 230). Although the creation of the OPDS(C) and the Defense Pact illustrates that the 
“regional grouping … desires to work as one on matters of defense and security” (Ngoma 
2003: 25), there remain a number of problems in achieving the goal of SADC’s security 
integration. Therefore, both the OPDS(C) and the Defense Pact cannot be viewed purely as 
legal tools in resolving security conflicts in the region. Instead, they were made and remade 
by SADC leaders to provide security mechanisms to be largely utilized as a political rather 
than legal means. 
For SADC, collective identity can be illustrated in the context of regional flexibility 
and/or exceptionalism, which is developed through constitutive interactions and which form 
the basis of its collective action. As collective identity is a basis for “feeling of solidarity, 
community, and loyalty” (Wendt 1996: 53), SADC states seem to have attempted to forge 
collective identities in their own regional context. By implication, thus, this indicates that 
SADC plays a critical role not only in bringing forth a sense of collective (regional) identity, 





After the end of apartheid and the Cold War, SADC members attempted to restructure the 
regional security architecture. Despite a number of flaws in developing the security 
mechanism(s), SADC leaders were, to some extent, successful in achieving regional 
solidarity and consensus on integrating their security structures. As noted earlier, the SADC 
member countries have evolved the degree of formalization and institutionalization of 
security frameworks in the region even before SADC(C) was born.  
Nonetheless, SADC kept maintaining the focus on such political norms as sovereignty, 
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equality and territorial integrity. The deep commitment of the organization to these norms 
can be understood in the context of regional identities which are closely interrelated with 
their unique historical experiences as well as political dynamics. Moreover, what is 
important for the leaders of SADC is to commit themselves to political norms such as 
national sovereignty in which individual members attempt to allow for a flexible approach to 
regional security problems. In fact, the commitment of the members of SADC to the 
principle of the modern Westphalian state system shows that the member states are still 
preoccupied with the search for internal stability and regime security. As examined in the 
cases of the insertion of Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact, therefore, the 
member states of SADC appear to re-emphasize the continued validity of the norm of non-
interference not only to protect national sovereignty, but also to improve the level of 
flexibility and/or exceptionality in addressing regional security problems. 
In examining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in SADC, it can be 
assumed that politico-security regionalism in SADC should not be treated as unchangeable 
and fixed entities, but rather as continually evolving and flexible ones to change and 
transform the international milieu and social context through various interactions. The key 
point here is the effect and role of constructivism in particular terms of the proposition of 
Wendt (1992) that “anarchy is what states make of it.” In this context, thus, focusing on the 
utility of constructivism in analyzing the SADC politico-security regionalism, this paper has 
shown that a constructivist perspective of IR is useful as an analytical tool to allow for the 
possibility of developing world regions to change the disadvantaged situations which 
contribute to understanding and explaining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism 
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